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A WISTFUL FAREWELL TO PINK BUGG & 
QUEEN CAROLINE* 
HOD. Joseph F. Murphy, Jr. 
Trial lawyers and trial judges have been applying 
the Maryland Rules of Evidence since Friday, July 1, 
1994. One of those rules modified the Rule in Queen 
Caroline's Case. I applaud that modification. Another 
abolished the Rule in Pink Bugg's Case. "The Rule in 
Pink Bugg's Case?" you ask. Yes, dear reader, there 
was such a rule. 
On October 19, 1964, Pink Bugg was one of the 
Cecil County taxicab drivers lined up at the Whistle Stop 
bus station in Perryville, awaiting the arrival of sailors 
returning to the Naval Training Station at Bainbridge. 
Although he was well back in the line when the first bus 
arrived, Bugg (in the words of another driver) "shot up, 
cut everybody off, loaded up a full load and went off to 
Bainbridge." He then raced back to the Whistle Stop 
and was now "first in line for the next bus." As the Court 
of Appeals noted, because his actions were "contrary to 
the prevailing custom," it was "no surprise that [several 
other drivers] took a rather dim view of Bugg's con-
duct." 
Just how dim a view they took was the subject of 
a civil action for assault that Bugg filed against three of 
the drivers. Representing himself in ajury trial, Bugg 
sought to establish the difference between what he 
looked like before the incident and what he looked like 
after the dust had settled. He called a neighbor to testify 
aboutthe dramatic change in his physical condition. This 
strategy did not succeed. The following transpired 
during the neighbor's direct examination: 
Q. (BY THE COURT) You say [that 
you saw] nothing unusual about his face 
or his head or anything? 
A. He looked that night just about like 
he is looking right now. He always had 
been a bad man, ever since I have been 
knowing him. Badman. Fights with me 
every time he gets in conversation with 
me. Bad man. Of course, he is my 
neighbor. We are neighbors. 
The evidentiary issue was generated by the 
following cross-examination ofBugg's neighbor: 
Q. (BY APPELLEES' COUNSEL) 
What is Mr. B ugg' s reputati on for good 
order, sobriety, peacefulness, and gen-
eral reputation in the neighborhood 
where he lives? Is it good or bad? 
MR. BUGG: I object to that. 
A. Itisbad. Badasanybodylhavemet 
since I have been in the world, and I will 
soon be 70 years old, December 27th. 
THE COURT: I overrule the objec-
tion. 
A. He is the baddest man I ever met. 
The trial judge entered a judgment against 
Bugg at the conclusion of his case-in-chief. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed that ruling as to defendant Brown 
(who had been home in bed on the evening in question), 
but reversed as to the other defendant -appellees. Bugg 
v. Brown, 251 Md. 99,246A.2d235 (1968). This case, 
however, was as important as it was amusing, because 
it established thatthere are civil cases in which a party's 
26.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - 27 
character for a relevant character trait is admissible 
circumstantial evidence of how he or she acted on the 
occasion at issue. As a general rule, the character of a 
party is not admissible in a civil case unless: (1) the 
nature of the proceedings, e.g., a defamation action, 
puts a party's reputation in issue; or (2) the party's 
character for veracity comes under attack during his or 
her testimony. Bugg, 251 Md. at 106,246 A.2d at 239. 
Under the Rule in Pink Bugg's Case, however, in civil 
actions for assault and battery--when the trier of fact 
must determine who was the initial aggressor--each 
party has the right to prove that the adverse party has a 
bad character for "turbulence." Id. 
That rule has been trumped by Rule 5-404( a)(1). 
Character testimony is no longer admissible as circum-
stantial evidence of how a party to a civil case probably 
acted on a particular occasion. Criminal defendants 
have a right to establish their good character for a trait 
that is pertinent to the crime. Md. Rule 5-404(a)(I)(A). 
Persons who are sued for assault, or for conduct that 
involves fraud, should have this right as well. 
That the Rule in Pink Bugg's Case has been 
abolished, however, is no reason to complain about the 
overall excellence of our new rules. These rules are 
working very well because many lawyers and judges 
worked very hard to accomplish the purpose set out in 
Rule 5-102. It would take all the space I have been 
allocated to identify each contributor. Two persons, 
however, deserve special commendation: Hon. Alan M. 
Wilner, Chair of the Rules Committee, and Professor 
Lynn McLain ofthe University of Baltimore School of 
Law. 
Now, back to the major changes. 
IMPEACHMENT 
Under the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, the 
lawyer who sought to impeach a non-party witness with 
a prior inconsistent written statement was prohibited 
from asking any questions about that statement until the 
witness--while on the stand--was given an opportunity 
to read it. This rule was based on the questionable 
assumption that witnesses will abide by the oath to 
testify truthfully. All too often, of course, it impaired 
counsel's ability to expose a deceitful witness. 
Rule 5-613(a) strikes an ideal balance. The 
witness must ultimately be given an opportunity to 
examine the statement, but not before answering ques-
tions about it. The significance ofthe change to Queen 
Caroline's Rule has been diminished somewhat by the 
adoption of Rule 5-802.1. Under this rule, derived from 
Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993), 
when a witness is on the stand, his or her prior inconsis-
tent written (or recorded) statement (or statement made 
under oath) is admissible as substantive evidence. 
Counsel now have less difficulty dealing with the shifty 
turncoat witness who has given a prior inconsistent 
written statement. 
Rule 5-616, which has no federal counterpart, is 
a very useful guide for trial lawyers and trial judges. It 
distinguishes "intrinsic" impeachment (in which the 
witness is asked about the impeaching fact) from "ex-
trinsic" impeachment (in which proof of the impeaching 
fact comes from a source other than the witness sought 
to be impeached). It identifies those modes of impeach-
ment that: (1) can only be pursued by questioning the 
witness, e.g., "prior bad acts;" (2) must be initially 
pursued by questioning the witness, e.g., "prior incon-
sistent statements;" and (3) may be pursued without 
questioning the witness, e.g., "bias." Under Rule 5-
616(b)(4), for example, extrinsic evidence offered to 
impeach a witness's "impaired ability" (to observe, 
recall, describe, etc.) is not admissible unless counsel 
questioned the witness on that point--or unless the 
judge is persuaded that "the interests of justice" would 
be best served by admitting the evidence despite the 
absence ofthe required foundation. This Rule also gives 
the judge discretion to admit: (1) impeachment evi-
dence that is "collateral" (i.e., the evidence is relevant 
to no issue other than the issue of whether the witness 
gave an untruthful answer to a particular question); and 
(2) "collateral" rehabilitation evidence as well. 
Rule 5-608 requires that the trial judge sustain 
a timely objection to "specific instances" impeachment 
unless, outside the hearing ofthe jury, counsel seeking 
to introduce such evidence establishes a "reasonable 
factual basis" to believe that the incident(s) occurred. 
CHARACTER 
When character is an essential element of the 
claim or the defense, a character witness can testify 
during direct examination about specific instances that 
form the basis of his or her personal opinion. On the 
other hand, when character testimony is being offered 
as circumstantial evidence, Rule 5-405 restricts specific 
instance testimony to cross-examination. That restric-
tion overrules the holding in Hemingway v. State, 76 
Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988). 
SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES 
Rule 5-407 excludes evidence of remedial mea-
sures undertaken subsequent to the plaintiff s inj ury. As 
a practical matter, proof of such measures will now be 
admitted only if the defendant is foolish enough to open 
the door by defending the claim on the theory that "there 
was nothing else we could have done." 
EXPERTS 
Case law required that an expert state the basis 
of his or her opinion before the opinion could be 
expressed. Rule 5-705 abolishes that requirement 
"(u)nless the court requires otherwise." 
Rule 5-706 provides for "court appointed ex-
perts." 
HEARSAY 
A person's non-asserti ve conduct is now treated 
as circumstantial evidence of his or her state of mind. 
While an "implied assertion" may well be excluded 
under some other rule, it will no longer be excluded 
under the rule against hearsay. 
Unlike the federal rules (that place an artificial 
"non-hearsay" label on certain out-of-court declara-
tions that are classic hearsay exceptions), our rules 
divide hearsay exceptions into three categories: (1) Rule 
5-802.1 contains those exceptions that apply only when 
the witness who testifies at trial is the person who made 
the out-of-court declaration; (2) Rule 5-804 contains 
those exceptions that apply only when the out-of-court 
declarant is "unavailable" to testify; and (3) Rule 5-803 
contains the exceptions that apply regardless of whether 
the out-of-court declarant is available to testify. The 
new rilles combine the best of the federal rules and our 
prior case law. 
When a writing qualifies as "past recollection 
recorded," it will now be read to the jury but it will not 
get into the jury room. A document now becomes 
"ancient" after twenty years. The "excited utterance" 
exception applies only to statements about the exciting 
event, rather than to any statement triggered by the 
exci ting event. A statement of intent to do something in 
the future is admissible to prove only the conduct of the 
declarant, rather than the conduct of the declarant and 
any other persons mentioned in the declaration. Learned 
treatises are no longer admissible for the limited pur-
pose of impeachment. "Dying declarations" are now 
admissible in civil cases as well as in prosecutions for 
offenses other than murder. The "prompt complaint" 
of a rape now applies to all sexual assaults. Everyone 
should be happy with the user-friendly exceptions for 
various kinds of records. 
The admissibility of "hearsay within hearsay" 
(e.g., a party's admission of negligence in the police 
report) is controlled by Rule 5-805, while the impeach-
ment (and rehabilitation) of hearsay declarants is con-
trolled by Rule 5-806. 
AUTHENTICATION 
A business record may now be authenticated 
through a certificate that complies with Rule 5-902, 
rather than through a "live" witness, provided that the 
lawyer who wishes to use this procedure complies with 
the notice requirement of Rule 5-902(a)(1l). The 
absence of an entry in a public record can also be proven 
by such a certificate, but it appears that testimony will 
still be required to prove the absence of an entry in a 
business record. Under Rule 5-902(a)(12), the court 
can require that any authentication objection be made 
before the trial begins. 
ODDS AND ENDS 
We now have a rule of "immediate complete-
ness" for all written, recorded, and transcribed state-
ments. Rule 5-1 06 extends to all such items the rule of 
completeness provided for depositions by Rule 2-
419(b). 
Rule 5-201 resolved any disagreement on the 
issue of whether counsel could introduce evidence that 
controverted a fact about which the court took judicial 
notice. The introduction of such evidence is prohibited 
by that rule. 
Rule 5-1004 provides for the introduction of 
"secondary" evidence when the absence ofthe original 
document has been excused. Case law required that 
counsel use the "best (i.e., most accurate, probative, 
reliable, satisfactory) secondary" evidence in such a 
situation. That requirement does not appear i~ the new 
rule. 
Offers of compromise, payment of medical 
expenses, and statements made during plea negotia-
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tions all enjoy more protection under the new rules. We 
now have "State's agent" and child's "support person" 
exceptions to the "sequestration" rule. Lawyers repre-
senting criminal defendants must be aware of the poten-
tial dangers lurking in Rules 5-41 O(b )(1),5-41 O(c), and 
5-611 (b )(2). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT 
PRESUMPTIONS 
Rule 5-301 ( a) provides for the method by whi ch 
the judge presiding over a civil trial decides whether the 
evidence offered to rebut a presumption: (1) is so 
conclusive that the presUJ;nption has been rebutted as a 
matter of law; (2) is so weak that the presumed fact 
stands established as a matter of law; or (3) has gener-
ated a genuine issue of controverted fact that must be 
resolved by the trier offact. According to the Committee 
Note, this rule was intended to codify the approach to 
presumptions taken by the Court of Appeals in Grier v. 
Rosenberg, 213 Md. 248,131 A.2d 737 (1957). Does 
this rule require a change in jury instructions? In the 
humble opinion of your author, the answer is "no," 
unless the Rule actually trumps the holding in Grier. Let 
us examine the facts of that case. 
On January 5, 1953,ataboutl :30P.M., Maurice 
Flather was driving a Baltimore Transit Compnay "track-
less trolley" on the "21 line" in Baltimore City. The bus 
was proceeding in a northerly direction on Caroline 
Street, and stopped to pick up passengers at the south-
east corner of Caroline and Monument Streets. Miss 
Mable Grier was the last passenger to board at that stop, 
and she was about to pay her fare when the traffic light 
changed to green for northbound traffic. 
As the bus began to enter the intersection, a blue 
car that had been positioned to its left made (in Flather' s 
words) "a sharp right hand turn in front of [the bus and] 
went east on Monument Street." Flather slammed on 
the breaks. As a result of the unusual stop, Miss Grier 
was thrown against the windshield of the bus and her 
head struck the rear view mirror. She ultimately sued (1) 
the Baltimore Transit Company; (2) Mr. Flather; and (3) 
Harry Rosenberg, the alleged owner of the blue car. 
A Baltimore City Court jury heard Mr. Flather 
testify that 72-751 was the license number of the blue car 
that caused the sudden stop, and heard the ChiefInves-
tigator of the Department of Motor Vehicles testify that 
this license number had been issued for an automobile 
owned by Mr. Rosenberg. The jurors also heard from 
Mr. Rosenberg, and ultimately returned a verdict in 
favor of each defendant. 
In a Memorandum Opinion explaining why he 
was denying Miss Grier's motion for a new trial, the 
trial judge provided the following summary of (1) Mr. 
Rosenberg's testimony; (2) the jury instructions on the 
issues generated by that testimony; and (3) the plain-
tiff s exception to those instructions: 
Rosenberg testified in his own 
behalf. The incident occurred January 
5. 1953, at Monument and Caroline 
Streets. His first knowledge of it was 
six months later when he received a 
letter from the Baltimore Transit Com-
pany dated July 13, 1953. The sub-
stance of his testimony is that he has no 
recollection of the incident, and there 
was no way for him, afterreceipt of said 
letter, to ascertain whether or not his 
automobile was atthe intersection men-
tioned at the particular time the incident 
occurred. Rosen berg is a distri butor 0 f 
coin operated machines with offices at 
the time at 1101 Cathedral Street. He 
lived a 3825 Copley Road, which is in 
northwest Baltimore, near Cold Spring 
Lane and Dolfield Avenue. His duties 
are in the office and he does very little 
traveling around the city. He uses his 
car to drive to the office each day and 
keeps it on a parking lot across from the 
office. His wife has a car. He checked 
his records and found nothing that would 
cause him to be in that section on that 
particular day. His employees have 
their own cars which they use to make 
service calls. Occasionally an employ-
ee may use Rosenberg's car and he 
does not ask the reason for doing so. 
He conferred with all his employees 
and they could not remember about the 
particular day. 
At the conclusion of the testi-
mony, the jury was instructed, in sub-
stance, that in order to render a verdict 
against Rosenberg, it must find: 
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(1) That an automobile crossed in front 
of the trolley. 
(2) That the automobile belonged to 
Rosenberg. 
(3) That Rosenberg or someone on 
Rosenberg's business was driving the 
automobile with his permission. 
(4) That the driver of the automobile 
was negligent. 
The jury was further instructed 
that the burden of proof was on the 
plaintiff to establish to their satisfaction, 
from all the evidence in the case, each 
and all of the above propositions, and if 
she failed to do so, or if their minds were 
in a state of even balance as to anyone of 
said propositions, their verdict should be 
in favor of Rosenberg. 
Plaintiff excepted to the charge. 
The ground of the exception appears to 
be that if the jury found propositions (1) 
and (2) above, there was a presumption 
that the automobile was being driven at 
the time either by Rosenberg, or on his 
business by his agent or servant, and the 
burden of overcoming the presumption 
was on Rosenberg. 
My late friend Amos Meyers, Esq., a fine person 
and a fine trial lawyer, was Miss Grier's counsel. The 
Record Extract contains the exception he interposed on 
Miss Grier's behalf, and the trial judge , s response to that 
exception: 
(Mr. Meyers) May I ask for a 
clarification of the three or four items 
wherein the court stated the obligation 
that the plaintiff must show of Mr. 
Rosenberg's negligence. I believe that in 
that connection, your Honor, you should 
tell the jury that the presumption is that 
the operator of the vehicle is the owner's 
agent and that then the burden is on the 
defendant Rosenberg to show the con-
trary, if they believe that was his car at 
the scene of the accident. 
(The Court) No, I think in view 
of the denial of ownership of the auto-
mobile alleged to have been involved, 
even if there was a presumption, the 
jury has to determine the matter from 
all the evidence. A prima facie case of 
agency probably results from proof of 
ownership and the presumption would 
be effective until evidence is offered 
from which a contrary finding may be 
made. When such evidence is offered, 
then it is my understanding that the trier 
of the facts has to determine the ques-
tion from all the evidence. The burden 
of proof never shifts. 
In the Court of Appeals, Amos prevailed on his 
contention that Miss Grier was entitled to a new trial 
because the Court held that the requested instruction 
"should have been given." Grier, 213 Md. at 252, 131 
A.2d at 739. The appellate court explained: 
In a long line of decisions of this 
Court, it has been held that there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the driver 
of an automobile is the agent, servant 
and!or employee of the owner thereof. 
.. [a]nd this includes a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the agent, servant and! or 
employee was operating the automo-
bile within the scope of his employ-
ment. (citations omitted) 
This Court also has previously 
approved the granting of instructions 
of this nature, relating to negligence. 
Indeed, if the instruction be not grant~ 
ed, how is the jury to know of the 
presumption? No matter how clearly 
the ownership of a motor vehicle might 
be established, without any informa-
tion of, or instruction concerning, the 
presumption, the jury might have great 
reluctance in finding the driver of such 
vehicle an agent or servant of the owner 
acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. 
Grier, 213 Md. at 252-253, 131 A.2d at 739. 
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Subsequent cases have made clear that the kind 
of presumption at issue in Grier shifts both the burden 
of production and the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., 
Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215 at 221-22,210 A.2d 743 
at 747-48 (1965). In Phillips, the evidence was suffi-
cient to require that the jury decide the question of 
whether the driver of an automobile involved in an 
accident was about the owner's business on that occa-
sion. The trial judge's instructions told the jurors, in 
essence, to answer that question "yes" unless they were 
persuaded to the contrary. This instruction was held to 
be entirely correct. Phillips, 239 Md. at 222,210 A.2d 
at 748. 
There are situations in which the jury must be 
instructed about an applicable presumption, e.g., the 
criminal defendant's presumption of innocence, or the 
presumption of correctness provided for by statute in 
Workers' Compensation and Health Claims proceed-
ings. Rule 5-301 makes no change to such instructions. 
Under Grier and Phillips, when the presumption at issue 
is the kind of evidentiary presumption that shifts both the 
burden of production and the burden of persuasion (e.g., 
the presumption that the driver is the agent of the owner, 
or the presumption that the grantee profited from a 
confidential relationship with the grantor), the jurors are 
instructed to find that the presumed fact is true unless 
they are affirmatively persuaded that it is not true. If 
Rule 5-301 now prohibits the kind of "burden shifting" 
instruction that "should have been given" in Grier v. 
Rosenberg, this Rule has made a most unfortunate 
change in the area of jury instructions. 
OTHER UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Will our "catchall" hearsay exceptions--Rules 
5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5)--admit any declaration 
that is a "near miss" under one of the traditional hearsay 
exceptions? I predict that the answer is "no." 
In products liability cases, will Rule 5-407 ex-
clude remedial measures taken prior to the date of the 
plaintiff s injury, but subsequentto the date on which the 
allegedly defective product entered the stream of com-
merce? That issue really should be resolved on a case-
by-case basis. 
Does the Frye-Reed test still apply to the expert 
opinion, an essential component of which is the result of 
a scientific test? Under Frye-Reed, scientific test re-
sults--and opinions that could not be expressed without 
reliance on such results--cannot be admitted into evi-
dence (in the absence of a statute or a reported opinion 
of a Maryland appellate court holding that the results 
are admissible) unless the proponent establishes that 
the relevant scientific community is in general agree-
ment that the scientific test at issue is capable of 
producing an accurate result. See, e.g., Keen Corp. v. 
Hall, 96 Md. App. 644 at 654-60, 626 A.2d 997 at 
1002-05 (1993); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor 
o/Baltimore, 336 Md. 145 at 181-83,647 A.2d405 at 
423-24 (1994). It took the Supreme Court eighteen 
years to announce that the Frye test was abolished 
when the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect. I 
am certain that it will not be that long a period of time 
before we learn whether the Frye-Reed test will be 
abandoned. I hope that this test will stay with us. 
Does our strict "evidence aliunde" rule still 
apply when a "vicarious admission" is offered under 
Rule 5-803(a)( 4) or (5), and the foundational proof of 
employment or concertive criminal conduct is in dis-
pute? Under the federal rules: (1) the judge, not the 
jury, decides whether the foundation is adequate; and 
(2) in making that decision, the judge is not restricted 
to evidence independent of the out-of-court declara-
tion at issue. There are good arguments for retaining 
the "evidence aliunde" rule, and good arguments for 
following the federal practice. 
I close with a reference to Rule 5-402, which 
reminds us that "decisional law not inconsistent with 
these rules" remains with us. By improving on the 
decisional law, the Maryland Rules of Evidence have 
made a sterling contribution to our jurisprudence. 
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